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Reshaping the Narrative Debate 
Nancy Levit† 
In Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class  
Matter, Joan Williams sets out to alter the terms of the public discussion 
about working, caregiving, and work-family conflicts.1 Other participants 
in this Colloquy discuss the ways in which she does a tremendous job of 
accomplishing this objective.2 Whether she intends it or not,3 Williams 
does something else that is extremely significant: she reframes part of the 
conversation about the use of narratives in legal analysis and policy-
making. 
This Essay describes the debate about narrative, or storytelling, in 
the legal academy. Two decades ago, a pitched jurisprudential battle sur-
faced in the pages of law reviews about the value of storytelling as legal 
scholarship.4 Since that time, narrative has sifted into academic texts in 
myriad ways; people are telling stories all over the place.5 Importantly 
also, research is emerging in cognitive neuroscience about the value of 
stories to human comprehension.6 And law schools are beginning to con-
sciously recognize that part of what they do is to train storytellers.7 
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Law. I am indebted to David Achtenberg, Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, Aaron Geary, Ann McGinley, 
and Allen Rostron for thoughtful comments, to research librarian Lawrence MacLachlan for guid-
ance, and to Alex Edelman for research assistance. 
 1. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS 
MATTER (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, “Trophy Husbands” & “Opt-Out” Moms, 34 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 663 (2011); Laura T. Kessler, Feminism for Everyone, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 679 
(2011); Ann C. McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 703 (2011); 
Lisa R. Pruitt, The Geography of the Class Culture Wars, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767 (2011); Katha-
rine B. Silbaugh, Deliverable Male, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 733 (2011). 
 3. It is difficult to think of the thoughtful, deliberate Joan Williams writing unintentionally, but 
her focus is on a different theme; it is easy, though, to think of her as being too humble to take credit 
for other accomplishments. 
 4. See infra text at notes 11–25. 
 5. See infra text at notes 26–47. 
 6. See infra text at notes 48–57. 
 7. See infra text at notes 35–38. 
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Another narrative phenomenon has also become more pronounced 
during this same time frame. The overwhelming majority of the informa-
tion people acquire comes from press accounts rather than reading origi-
nal materials. The media have a singular ability to prioritize public issues 
and mold perceptions. Thus, press-constructed stories have become an 
increasingly powerful tool impelling or obstructing policy change. Sto-
ries such as the “boy crisis in education,”8 “global cooling,”9 and the “lit-
igation explosion”10 capture the public’s attention, prompt policy discus-
sions, and at times spur legislation. It is this aspect of narrative for which 
Joan Williams’s methods are particularly illuminating. In the first several 
chapters of her book, she unpacks the “opt-out narrative” created by the 
press—the story that says women are choosing to leave the fast track of 
professional advancement in favor of stay-at-home motherhood. Her me-
thodology of empirically interrogating this storyline is incredibly valua-
ble for academics wondering what to do about media mythology. 
Part I of this Essay describes the history of the debate about the 
value of narrative as legal scholarship. Part II examines the explosion of 
stories and attention to storytelling both inside and outside the legal 
academy. It also reviews emerging evidence from cognitive neuroscience 
about the importance of stories to the ways humans understand the 
world. In Part III, the Essay centers on media-created narratives and fo-
cuses on Joan Williams’s instructive methodology for interrogating 
press-constructed myths. Moving from dismantling to reconstruction, 
                                                            
 8. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Kisthardt, Comment, Singling Them Out: The Influence of the “Boy 
Crisis” on the New Title IX Regulations, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 313, 314 (2007) (discussing the 
popular media’s proclamation of a “boy crisis” in education and its influence on educational policy 
and legal guidelines); see also Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 739–40, 743–46 (exploring the influence of 
the “gender achievement gap” on the single-sex education movement). 
 9. See, e.g., Thomas C. Peterson et al., The Myth of the 1970s Global Cooling Scientific Con-
sensus, 89 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 1325, 1329 (Sept. 2008) (reviewing thirty-five 
years of climate-change research). 
 10. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1348–49 (2002). 
For the last quarter-century, a dominant theme in journalistic coverage of the legal system 
has been that the United States has too much law, too many lawyers, and too little justice. 
In mainstream media accounts, America is suffering from an “epidemic” of legal hypo-
chondria, reaching “bubonic plague proportions.” Because stories sell better than statis-
tics, the evidence for such claims is largely anecdotal. . . . For example, a suitor who is 
fed up when stood up sues his date, a customer who spills hot coffee on herself demands 
millions from McDonald’s, and a woman who shampoos her poodle and then tries to dry 
it in a microwave demands compensation for the unhappy outcome. . . . To most scholars, 
the legal landscape looks quite different. As they note, litigation rates in the United States 
are not exceptionally high in comparison with prior eras or with other nations not known 
for contentiousness. Experts estimate that tort liability represents no more than two per-
cent of the cost of American goods and services, and that liability risks absorb only about 
twenty-five cents of every $100 in revenue. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Part IV circles back to the importance of stories—and the ways academ-
ics can develop counternarratives that can help reshape public under-
standings about work, families, and fairness. 
I. THE STORYTELLING DEBATE IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
More than twenty years ago, some groundbreaking theorists in the 
legal academy made a case for legal scholarship to incorporate the sto-
ries—the lived experiences—of outsiders.11 Neutral legal principles, they 
observed, were not really neutral; those legal rules encompassed racist 
and sexist norms. Traditional scholarship for centuries had excluded the 
perspectives of subordinated groups—voices from “the bottom.”12 
The stories contributed by feminists and critical race theorists found 
a home in some of the most prestigious law reviews in the country. They 
revealed the types of discrimination faced by people outside the main-
stream—biases associated with dress, language, accent, or “foreign-
ness.”13 The stories described the experiences of a black man who was 
prohibited from buying a suburban home even though he could afford 
it.14 They told about the brutality of police intimidation15 and the pheno-
menon of Driving While Black.16 The stories illuminated stereotypes of 
third- and fourth-generation Asian-Americans: “You speak such good 
English.”17 They told of maternal-wall discrimination: the attorney who 
returned from maternity leave and was given the work of a paralegal, and 
                                                            
 11. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971 (1991); 
Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. 
REV. 343 (1991); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for 
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411(1988) [hereinafter Delgado, Storytelling]; William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994); Charles Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him 
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response 
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsu-
da, Public Response]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as 
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989). 
 12. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324–26 (1987). 
 13. See Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Greñas: Un/Masking the Self While 
Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 185 (1994); Juan F. 
Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of American Racial 
Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213 (1997). 
 14. Eleanor Marie Brown, Note, The Tower of Babel: Bridging the Divide Between Critical 
Race Theory and “Mainstream” Civil Rights, 105 YALE L.J. 513, 513 (1995). 
 15. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the 
Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 156 & n.89 (1987). 
 16. David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” 
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999). 
 17. Margaret Chon, On the Need for Asian American Narratives in Law: Ethnic Specimens, 
Native Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 ASIAN-PAC. AM. L.J. 4, 6 (1995). 
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who said, “I had a baby, not a lobotomy.”18 Gay and lesbian legal theor-
ists told stories too, so that their relationships would no longer be invisi-
ble in law—such as stories of losing a “domestic partner” in the 9/11 tra-
gedy and the need for workers’ compensation benefits for the family.19 
Personal stories like these enriched understandings of the situations of 
disempowered people.20 
The storytelling movement met major resistance from traditional 
theorists. Stories, said opponents, are not an appropriate methodology of 
legal scholarship. One of the primary critiques was that stories posed 
problems of reliability and validity: stories are, in many respects, nonfal-
sifiable, and they might not be representative of universal experiences.21 
To the extent that they describe personal experiential truths, the argu-
ment went, personal stories contain subjective impressions and cannot be 
verified.22 Opponents also argued that stories are not analytical—they 
present a one-sided, emotionally painted view of a situation.23 Other 
skeptics suggested something of the opposite—that narratives even failed 
on the psychological front because outsiders did not have a unique pers-
pective.24 In the view of objectors, stories were irrational, emotional, un-
verifiable, and incendiary. 
What was the outcome of the narrative battle over the past couple 
of decades? In important dimensions, stories changed the way legal aca-
demics thought about scholarship. People in the legal academy began to 
understand something scholars in other disciplines had known for a long 
time—that people comprehend events in narrative form.25 Storytelling 
became part of a reconstructive project of reimagining law. The next part 
of this Essay turns to the ways narrative is now both embedded and blos-
soming in legal theory. 
                                                            
 18. Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 588 (1996). 
 19. John O. Enright, Comment, New York’s Post-September 11, 2001 Recognition of Same-Sex 
Relationships: A Victory Suggestive of Future Change, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2823 (2004). 
 20. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Foreword: This Bridge Called Our Backs: An Introduction to 
“The Future of Critical Race Feminism,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 733, 736–37 (2006). 
 21. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further 
Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna 
Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). 
 22. See Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider 
Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1281–82 (1995). 
 23. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT 
ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 37, 99–102 (1997). 
 24. See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 
1778–87 (1989). 
 25. Nancy Levit & Allen Rostron, Calling for Stories, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2007). 
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II. IT’S STORIES, ALL THE WAY DOWN 
Philosopher William James once explained what an “absolute mo-
ralist” believed by describing a series of rocks, one rock resting atop 
another foundational one: “it was rocks all the way down.”26 A perhaps 
apocryphal story growing out of this, maybe influenced by Hindu cos-
mology, which posits that the Earth rests on the back of a giant turtle 
(and probably promoted by Dr. Seuss’s Yertle the Turtle), is that “[i]t’s 
turtles all the way down.”27 This metaphor became important in jurispru-
dence circles when critical legal studies scholars began to explain how 
power worked.28 It is an explanation that applies to narrative as well. 
Everyone tells stories: People in power tell stories too. It’s stories all the 
way down. 
A. The Narrative Explosion 
In the past several decades, stories have sifted into the ways we 
think about and practice law. Just as judges, legislators, and legal educa-
tors began to pay attention to stories and narrative theory, jurisprudential 
theorists of many different types also warmed to stories. Stories changed 
the language of legal discourse. Some law review articles, legal deci-
sions, books, and other legal texts moved from a formal, objective, de-
personalized style to first-person narration or conveying experiential in-
sights.29 Even statutes began to be named for crime victims—and 
represent their stories—rather than for their legislative sponsors.30 
                                                            
 26. Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 1–2 n.4 (1986) (quot-
ing WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE 85 (1979)). 
 27. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 28–29 (1973); STEPHEN W. 
HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 1 (1988). 
 28. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Radical Moderation, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 329, 
329–30 (1985). 
 29. ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR. & NANCY LEVIT, JURISPRUDENCE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS, 
PROBLEMS, AND NARRATIVES 268 (1994). For an example of how narrative is used to effectively 
convey experiential insight, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Women at the Bar—A Generation of Change, 
2 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1 (1978), reprinted in 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 649 (2011). 
 30. Compare, e.g., McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1945) (sponsored by 
Senators Pat McCarran and Homer Ferguson), and the Hyde Amendment, 93 Stat. 926 (1979) (spon-
sored by Representative Henry Hyde), with Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act, H.R. 1913, 111th Cong. (2009) (“Matthew Shepard was a gay college student who 
was tortured and murdered in Laramie, Wyoming, and James Byrd, Jr., was an African-American 
man who was dragged to death in Jasper, Texas.” Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (2009), http://www.hrc.org/issues/5660.htm), 
and Megan’s Law (“[N]amed after seven-year-old Megan Kanka, a New Jersey girl who was raped 
and killed by a known child molester who had moved across the street from the family without their 
knowledge. . . . All states now have a form of Megan’s Law.” Megan’s Law, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (2009), http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/homepage. 
aspx?lang=ENGLISH), and The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 (“[The 
bill] was named [for] James S. Brady . . . the White House press secretary severely wounded in the 
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Narratives have encouraged law reform in many different do-
mains.31 Victims of intimate-partner violence have shared their stories—
and in so doing have reframed the prevailing image of domestic-violence 
victims. There is now room for women who do not fit the stereotype of 
the “passive, middle-class white woman”—i.e., women who fight back—
to have their situations understood.32 At criminal sentencing hearings, 
victim impact statements can tell the stories of the effects of horrific 
crimes on the victims.33 Reciprocally, death-penalty narratives have told 
the stories of capital defendants who had extreme mental impairments or 
inadequate legal representation and sometimes were not guilty the old-
fashioned way: they didn’t commit the crime.34 Personal narratives have 
been used very effectively to urge changes in legal doctrine. 
Legal educators began to realize that storytelling was among the 
skills they were training. Lawyers are raconteurs: they construct stories 
and tell them to other lawyers and to decision-makers. The Carnegie Re-
port calls for more and better training of law students in the skills of 
narrative thinking and storytelling.35 Students need to understand narra-
tive theory—that they will make choices about what facts matter and 
how to tell stories persuasively—and they need practice in telling sto-
ries.36 Law professors have begun to write about ways to help students 
learn how to incorporate narrative techniques into brief writing and oral 
                                                                                                                                     
1981 assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan.” Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Signs Bill 
on Guns into Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1993, at A20). 
 31. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa-
tion, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 11. 
 32. See Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She 
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75 (2008). 
 33. Karen Marie Katz, Opposing Scales of Justice: Victims’ Voices in the Sentencing Process, 
14 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 187–88 (2010) (noting that in some jurisdictions, victims can even 
make sentencing recommendations); see also Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative 
Problems at the Criminal Trial, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 135 
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). 
 34. See, e.g., Melody Dickson, Comment, Dismantling the Free Will Fairytale: The Impor-
tance of Demonstrating the Inability to Overcome in Death Penalty Narratives, 77 UMKC L. REV. 
1123 (2009); see also Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Regulating Death: Capital Punishment and the 
Late Liberal State, 111 YALE L.J. 681, 683–84 (2001) (“Woven together, these stories have loosened 
the grip of conventional pro-death penalty narratives, which told of disingenuous lawyers manipulat-
ing legal technicalities in order to postpone indefinitely the execution of coddled criminals. In their 
stead, we often now hear a new, more skeptical narrative in which innocent persons are not infre-
quently hustled toward the death chamber by officials who, like all other government bureaucrats, 
are prone to corruption and slipshod work.”). 
 35. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 96–97 (2007). 
 36. Carolyn Grose, Storytelling Across the Curriculum: From Margin to Center, From Clinic 
to the Classroom, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 37, 39–41 (2010). 
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advocacy37 and to encourage students to think about the ethical implica-
tions of how they will frame clients’ stories.38 
In the mid-1990s, Martha Minow and Austin Sarat developed a se-
ries for the University of Michigan Press, Law, Meaning, and Violence, 
to illuminate the ways the stories of law create meanings and social 
norms.39 A cascade of books containing legal narratives followed. Foun-
dation Press created the Law Stories book series that recounts the tales 
behind landmark cases in specific subject areas, such as constitutional 
law, family law, and immigration, to reveal the background, parties, so-
cial context, lawyering, historical impact, and other human elements in 
major cases.40 The UMKC Law Review has had an annual stories section 
in its summer issue each year for four years.41 
In the realm of legal theory, many different schools of jurispru-
dence picked up the prompt from critical race theorists. They learned the 
lesson that “[s]tories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful 
means for destroying mindset[s]—the bundle of presuppositions, re-
ceived wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of 
which legal and political discourse takes place.”42 It wasn’t just feminists 
and postmodernists and other outsiders who began to tell stories.43 Tradi-
tional theorists also got into the act. But maybe they had always been in 
the game: “Dworkin’s heroic ‘Herculean’ judge and Holmes’s one-
dimensional ‘bad man,’ for example, are central devices by which these 
jurists convey their conceptions of the meaning of law.”44 
                                                            
 37. See Brian J. Foley, Applied Legal Storytelling, Politics, and Factual Realism, 14 LEGAL 
WRITING 17 (2008); Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on 
How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459 
(2001); Carolyn Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients’ Stories, 12 CLINICAL. L. REV. 
329 (2006). 
 38. See Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2000). 
 39. See, e.g., GARY BELLOW & MARTHA MINOW, LAW STORIES (1996). See generally Law, 
Meaning, and Violence, THE UNIV. OF MICH. PRESS, http://www.press.umich.edu/series.do?id= 
UM76 (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
 40. West Academic Product Lines: Law Stories Series, WEST ACADEMIC FACULTY ONLINE 
STORE (last visited Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.westacademic.com/Professors/ProductLines.aspx? 
tab=1. 
 41. See, e.g., Law Stories: One L Revisited, 78 UMKC L. REV. 1015 (2010) (with an introduc-
tion by Scott Turow). 
 42. Delgado, Storytelling, supra note 11, at 2413. 
 43. See Mario L. Barnes, Black Women’s Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the Power 
of Narrative, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941 (2006); Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting “Unwel-
comeness” From the Outside: Using Case Theory to Tell the Stories of Sexually Harassed Women, 
14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 61 (2007). 
 44. Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145, 146 (1985). 
758 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:751 
Even law and economics theorists dabbled in stories,45 although 
perhaps they too had been telling stories the whole time: “Law and Eco-
nomics scholarship is full of stories about how liberal rights and regula-
tion designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, un-
dermining its promised rewards.”46 Feminists and critical theorists 
pointed out that, really, everyone tells stories, except that “[d]ominant 
narratives are not called stories. They are called reality.”47 
B. Understandings about Narrative and Neuroscience 
[W]e dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, antic-
ipate, hope, despair, believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticise, construct, 
gossip, learn, hate and live by narrative.48 
Over the same couple of decades that stories began to abound in the 
legal academy, cognitive psychologists were beginning to empirically 
demonstrate that stories are the way people understand the world. Creat-
ing a storyline is fundamental to how humans comprehend and remember 
events.49 “The brain is structured, or ‘wired,’ to detect patterns” and en-
coding ideas in story form is a better way than simply conveying facts to 
“encourage . . . the recognition of new patterns and relationships among 
objects and ideas.”50 People retain about one-fifth of what they read, but 
                                                            
 45. Wayne Eastman, Telling Alternative Stories: Heterodox Versions of the Prisoners’ Dilem-
ma, the Coase Theorem, and Supply-Demand Equilibrium, 29 CONN. L. REV. 727, 728 (1997). 
 46. Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right’s Rise, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1267 (2007); see also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Metho-
dology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 351 (2001). 
 47. Catharine A MacKinnon, Law’s Stories as Reality and Politics, in LAW’S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 232, 235 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); see 
also RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES 194–95 (1995) (“White folks tell stories, too. 
But they don’t seem like stories at all, but the truth. So when one of them tells a story . . . few con-
sider that a story, or ask whether it is authentic, typical, or true. No one asks whether it is adequately 
tied to legal doctrine, because it and others like it are the very bases by which we evaluate legal 
doctrine.”). 
 48. Bret Rappaport, Tapping the Human Adaptive Origins of Storytelling by Requiring Legal 
Writing Students to Read a Novel in Order to Appreciate How Character, Setting, Plot, Theme, and 
Tone (CSPTT) Are as Important as IRAC, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 267, 268 n.2 (2008) (alteration 
omitted) (quoting JANICE MCDRURY & MAXINE ALTERIO, LEARNING THROUGH STORYTELLING IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION 31 (Kogan Page 2003) (2002)). 
 49. JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3 (2001) (“[P]eople tend to organize their experiences in story 
form. . . . [W]e use stories to make sense of our lives and relationships.”). 
 50. Delores D. Liston, Abstract, Story-telling and Narrative: A Neurophilosophical Perspec-
tive, ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 372092 (1994), available at http://www.eric. 
ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/search/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=ED3
72092&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=ED372092. 
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will remember about four-fifths of the images they form in their minds.51 
Stories are recalled much better than sterile facts because stories are es-
sentially remembered as symbols or images. 
Cognitive neuroscientists have documented that narratives provide 
a holistic learning experience. Narratives trigger a release of neuro-
transmitters that affect both hemispheres of the brain.52 Stories activate 
both the rational (the frontal cortex) and the emotional (midbrain neural 
centers) parts of the brain.53 People processing narratives engage with 
them both factually, as argument, and emotionally, because they create 
an affective response. “Thus, stories are . . . more interesting, more me-
morable, and more persuasive than other narrative forms.”54 Stories don’t 
just entertain, they provide a structure for organizing and understanding a 
chain of events. 
Narrative is more than a powerful method of learning; it is also an 
extremely influential method of persuasion. Stories provoke interest, they 
invite involvement,55 and they encourage empathetic imagination.56 Sto-
ries create a connection between the teller and the listener. At the end of 
the day, “a trial is not a debate; it’s a contest of stories. The strong-
est . . . most persuasive, most inspiring story will win. Juries pick the 
story they want to win; they don’t pick the stack of facts they want to 
win . . . .”57 
III. INTERROGATING PRESS-CONSTRUCTED NARRATIVES 
What happens, though, when stories persuade out of proportion to 
their truth value? This is of particular concern when the stories are told 
not within the pages of academic texts, which provide a relatively open-
access forum for critique, but in the popular media. 
                                                            
 51. Michael Berman, A Few Words on Story-telling, HUMANIZING LANGUAGE TEACHING 
MAG., May 2003, http://www.hltmag.co.uk/may03/pubs4.htm (“Storytelling uses the left brain’s 
functions (language, a story line, sequences of cause and effect) to speak the right brain’s language 
of symbolic, intuitive, imaginative truths.”). 
 52. John Batt, Law, Science, and Narrative: Reflections on Brain Science, Electronic Media, 
Story, and Law Learning, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 19, 25 (1990); see also JONAH LEHRER, HOW WE 
DECIDE (2009). 
 53. Steven J. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist? An Essay on the Ethical Limits of 
Applied Storytelling, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 63, 82 (Fall 2010). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 411, 443–44. 
 56. Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story, 7 
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A. The Media Construction of Reality 
The American public gleans most of its news from popular media 
stories in television, radio, magazine, and the Internet, rather than from 
original sources, professional journals, or scientific studies. Popular me-
dia views of many topics, such as science or health risks or criminal jus-
tice, “constitute the primary source of information for the vast majority 
of people.”58 
The influence of popular-media-based knowledge is extraordinary. 
The news media have a singular ability to spotlight attention on issues, 
provide cues about the significance of issues, and sway public opinion.59 
The ways in which media present issues have a huge impact on public 
attitudes, particularly for people who are less informed about those issues 
to start.60 “[T]he role of the media as an information provider . . . remains 
critical . . . [e]ven if you do not accept the simple linear relationship be-
tween popular media representations and public perceptions.”61 Social-
media networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, both amplify the speed at 
which news travels and aggravate the distortions because they transmit 
information but offer minimal to no fact-checking.62 
Since public opinion is so dramatically influenced by the popular 
media, stories that are exaggerated or slanted, let alone false, pose se-
rious problems for the shaping of cultural understandings. Some stories, 
such as the myths about global cooling or healthcare legislation creating 
“death panels,” are empirically just flat wrong—yet touted in the me-
dia.63 Other media-fueled misconceptions include “alarmist stories about 
misuse of genetic information,”64 the myth that the estate tax causes 
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people to have to sell their family farms,65 publicized accounts of the 
“crack baby” phenomenon to justify prenatal and postnatal drug testing 
principally for mothers of color,66 and tales, unsubstantiated by any po-
lice reports, that teenagers are having “pharm parties” where they take 
miscellaneous drugs from their parents’ medicine cabinets, mix them in a 
big bowl, and then eat handfuls of the random mixture of pills.67 
The press also has a tendency to exaggerate the incidence of violent 
crimes (at a time when state and national crime rates are falling), as well 
as to vastly overrepresent members of racial minorities as perpetrators68 
and white women as victims—the “missing white woman syndrome.”69 
Of course, the repetitions of stories that are slanted or false can make 
them seem like truths.70 That these stories take hold in the public imagi-
nation is testament to the extraordinary power of the media. 
Joan Williams offers a tremendous example of how to interrogate 
irresponsible narratives like these media-constructed stories. She demon-
strates what can be done about anecdotal accounts in the media that are 
coupled with sensational or misleading portrayals. 
B. Unpacking the Stories 
From the standpoint of gender equality, some of the most perni-
cious media-driven myths have to do with motherhood. This is where 
Joan Williams performs a brilliant tour de force. She describes and meti-
culously dismantles the press-created “opt-out” narrative and does this in 
the service of reshaping the work-family debate, as her title states, and 
moving toward gender equality. Her methods of unpacking slanted or 
false press-constructed stories go well beyond this particular narrative 
about women and work though. 
The “opt-out” story is that professional women are “discovering 
that they ‘really are’ different than men, that women’s priorities are dif-
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ferent, and that the lure of children pulls them away from work and into 
the home sweet home.”71 These stories, splashed across the front page or 
cover of newspapers and magazines, make provocative claims, such as 
“Many Women at Elite Colleges Set Career Path to Motherhood” or 
“The Opt-Out Revolution.”72 The stories quote predominantly white 
mothers talking about how challenging it is to juggle a good job and take 
care of children. The resolution offered by these press accounts is that 
women in general are “happily” making the choice to leave their presti-
gious jobs, “joyfully embracing their role as stay-at-home moms, and 
cheerfully giving up the luxuries their paychecks used to cover.”73 This 
storyline, says Williams, is inaccurate, misleading, and rife with classist 
illusions. 
Williams examines the content of 119 news stories appearing in 
print over a period from 1980 to 2006. One of the first things she notes is 
that the press coverage centers on “the 3.7% of American women who 
are highly educated white professionals.”74 This assumption that highly 
educated women are more likely to leave the labor force is unsupported 
by statistics. It is more often lower-income and less-educated women, 
rather than middle- or higher-income women, who are stay-at-home 
mothers.75 Williams notes, “By failing to include women who work in 
nonprofessional jobs, working mothers of color, and those with lower 
levels of education, the press presents a highly misleading picture of 
work-family conflict.”76 The opt-out story is statistically wrong: less-
educated women are more likely to leave the work force; well-educated 
women do so much less. 
Minimized in the press stories are the forces pushing women out of 
the labor market: workplace inflexibility regarding hours, minimal sick 
leave and maternity leave, the absence of good and affordable child care, 
tax penalties for joint tax filers, and discrimination against women who 
are mothers.77 Almost completely omitted are the economic conse-
quences of their leaving. Only one-tenth of the rosy opt-out articles even 
considered the longer-term economic picture for women who leave the 
workforce.78 Williams documents that reentry into the workforce is diffi-
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cult for women who leave it, and the earnings consequences are im-
mense: “[L]eaving the workforce has a significant effect on women’s 
wages even twenty years after a career interruption.”79 Not a single one 
of the articles made the connection between mothers leaving the work-
force and the economic vulnerability of women.80 
The opt-out stories are implicitly tied to a particular political mes-
sage: the ideal of a male breadwinner and a stay-at-home mother. “Near-
ly two-thirds (64%) of the articles surveyed refer to a return to ‘tradition-
al’ gender roles.”81 Women who leave the workforce are portrayed as 
“selfless” and they are invited to engage in “intensive mothering” activi-
ties.82 Again omitted are the sociological data. Most mothers (84%), ac-
cording to one study, did not get an education and enter the workforce 
with the objective of staying at home.83 Modern studies also show that 
“[e]mployed mothers now spend as much time interacting with their 
children as did stay-at-home mothers in 1975.”84 Those studies also rein-
force a theme about class divisions—“[i]ntensive mothering is utterly 
outside the realm of possibility for less-affluent families.”85 
Perhaps most importantly, the opt-out story locates the solution to 
the work-family debate in individual choice. Individual women can 
“choose” to resolve the tensions between work and family by just elect-
ing to stay home with the kids. It is a resolution that is not desired by 
most women, won’t work for many women, and one that completely 
omits institutional and social responsibility for the architecture of the 
workplace. 
Williams’s disassembling of the press-constructed opt-out story is a 
powerful template for ways to challenge erroneous media myths that are 
often accepted without critique. First, she interrogates the storyline using 
sociological data. Second, she makes clear the race and class slant of the 
inquiries and the resulting implicit message: that the primary tension be-
tween wage-earning and child care is a “champagne problem enjoyed by 
upper middle-class women in white-collar jobs” and a “triumphalist tale” 
of individual choice.86 Third, she brings to the table the dimensions that 
are overlooked or omitted by the standard form of press coverage—the 
ways mothering today differs from mothering in the past, the economic 
consequences of opting out, and the absence of other choices. She re-
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veals that the storyline—internal motivations rather than institutional 
pressures spur women to choose motherhood—is a fraud. The work-
family balance is an area where the workplace is being remade, slowly, 
and along class lines, to accommodate a new reality. So the media stories 
to which Williams objects are actually taking a new phenomenon, the 
remaking of the relationship between work and family, and translating it 
into an old one—the reassertion of traditional gender roles. 
Williams also spends time exploring the ways public policies could 
change to architect a much different world of work. This world does not 
force binary choices—stay at home or work. It is one that provides some 
flexibility in work scheduling and family support, such as sick leave and 
parenting time and healthcare. It is also a world that is concrete, rather 
than imaginary: Williams repeatedly draws on the examples of other in-
dustrialized nations that provide various types of support for working 
parents, such as hourly caps on the workweek, the right to work part-
time, paid parental leave, and universal health coverage.87 
Her methods are very helpful in drawing on provable facts to show 
that the myth is wrong, in searching for different implications of social 
conditions for different identity groups and classes, and of looking for 
unexamined truths. These techniques could be useful in changing percep-
tions regarding other media-constructed stories. But there is a missing 
piece. 
IV. CONSTRUCTING NEW NARRATIVES 
The difficulty is that press-constructed narratives have enormous 
staying power.88 Women in the workforce may draw on narratives that 
are in the ether—and the opt-out narrative may remain until a powerful 
competing narrative materializes. The need, then, is to go beyond rebut-
ting the myth of the opt-out narrative and to create a new story to explain 
our reality. Williams hints at a counternarrative that is emerging, but 
frames it in terms of acquiring a broader-based political coalition rather 
than as a story.89 
She does note that women need to work and that employers need 
women’s labor, but the way it plays out by class is problematic. What 
seems to be impeding a compelling counternarrative is class differences. 
It is this story that needs flesh: the story of flexible workplaces, even for 
blue-collar jobs; the economic benefits for employers—in employee re-
tention and reduced turnover—of affording workplace choices and mak-
ing workplaces family friendly; and the remaking of gender attitudes to 
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accommodate different notions of male–female partnerships. While this 
latter process is underway, and further along for the middle class than the 
working class, the missing piece of the transformation is reaching the 
public with the message. 
Perhaps it is this storyline that both academics and journalists can 
create going forward. In a later writing, Williams has applauded the New 
York Times for focusing “not on mothers’ choices but on the ways the 
labor market pushes mothers out of good jobs.”90 Looking for the good is 
helpful in nudging the press toward greater accuracy in reporting. 
Law is tremendously important in creating more family-friendly 
workplace norms. So is taking the message to the public about ways to 
remake workplaces to allow more flexibility for men and women in ba-
lancing work and family obligations. Other academics are also realizing 
that reaching outside of sterile academic tracts to communicate with a 
popular audience has tremendous potential to create cultural shifts.91 
Perhaps the challenge in the academic realm is to retain and tell the au-
thentic stories of experience that “humanize the continuing struggle for 
equality.”92 
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